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This article provides a description of the four methods of financial
system regulation currently in use internationally, with case studies
illustrating each system. Analysis is provided of the strengths and
weaknesses of each. Research indicates that the ‘Twin Peaks’ system
is superior to its peers. However, this paper also concludes, by
reference to failings observed in ‘Twin Peaks’ arrangements to date,
that ‘Twin Peaks’ alone is no panacea against financial crises, or
market and consumer abuse. It is merely the best form of regulatory
architecture. Other factors, such as the capacity and willingness of
the regulators to discharge their mandate, even within a sound
regulatory architecture, are as important to the success of financial
system regulation, as evidenced by the failures in the UK around the
time of the Global Financial Crisis, and as evidenced by the success
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of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, despite Singapore’s suboptimal regulatory structure.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), and the
catastrophic scale of regulatory failure, much attention has been paid
to the various systems of financial system regulation currently in
force. Of the total of four financial regulatory systems currently in
use, ‘Twin Peaks’ has garnered the most interest, and gained
widespread recognition2; as has Australia both as an exemplar of

2

Erlend W. Nier, Jacek Osiński, Luis I. Jácome & Pamela Madrid, “Institutional

Models for Macroprudential Policy”, in IMF Staff Discussion Note, no. SDN/11/18,
Monetary and Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund, 1
November, 2011, p. 15/16. See also: De Nederlandsche Bank, “IMF publishes its
report on financial sector and supervision in the Netherlands”, in News, De
Nederlandsche Bank, 22 June, 2011, accessed: 9 January, 2015; Michael Taylor,
“Regulatory reform after the financial crisis. Twin Peaks revisited”, Chap. 1, in
Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories and International
Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & Dirk Schoenmaker, in ‘Part I,
Fundamental theories’, series editor: Routledge Research in Finance and Banking
Law, 1st ed., 2014; Dirk Schoenmaker & Jeroen Kremers, “Financial stability and
proper business conduct. Can supervisory structures help to achieve these
objectives?”, Chap. 2, in Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories
and International Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & Dirk Schoenmaker, in
‘Part I, Fundamental theories’, series editor: Routledge Research in Finance and
Banking Law, 1st ed., 2014; Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Implementing Twin
Peaks. Lessons from Australia”, Chap. 5, in Institutional Structure of Financial
Regulation: Theories and International Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang &
Dirk Schoenmaker, in ‘Part II, International experiences’, series editor: Routledge
Research in Finance and Banking Law, 1st ed., 2014; Brooke Masters, “Focus on
G20 vow to raise financial standards”, ‘Front Page’, The Financial Times, Morning
ed., 15 October, 2009 03:00 am.
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‘Twin Peaks’3, and in its success in navigating the worst of the GFC. 4
As a result of these factors, several countries have moved or are
moving towards a ‘Twin Peaks’ system, most notably the Republic of
South Africa5 (RSA) and the United Kingdom (UK).
In an effort to place ‘Twin Peaks’ in context, this article makes
a comparative analysis of the four systems in use, along with
descriptive case studies. Particular attention is paid to the failings of
the previous UK regulatory arrangement, and the success of
Singapore, in order to demonstrate that the solution to successful
prudential regulation, and regulatory enforcement, is not simply the
regulatory architecture. It is as much a function of regulator culture,
inter-agency co-ordination, and regulatory philosophy. Additional
analysis is also provided for Germany, due to the importance of its
banking sector.6
The four systems are described in the following order: first, the
institutional or traditional approach (with emphasis on China, Mexico
and Hong Kong); second, the functional approach (with a description

3

John Trowbridge, “The Regulatory Environment - A Brief Tour”, Paper presented

at the National Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA) Conference, Sydney, NSW,
22 September 2009, p. 2.
4

Kevin Davis, “The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet”,

Paper presented at the The Australian Economy in the 2000s Conference, Sydney,
NSW, series editor: Hugo Gerard & Jonathan Kearns, in ‘Publications’, Conference
Volume ed., 15-16 August 2011, pp. 301/341/344. Contra, see: Alan Erskine,
“Regulating the Australian Financial System”, in Funding Australia’s Future,
Australian Centre for Financial Studies, July, 2014, p. 4.
5

A. J. Godwin & A.D. Schmulow, “The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South

Africa: Lessons From Australia”, South African Law Journal (forthcoming, 2015).
6

European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, “Banking Structures Report”, series

edited by European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, no. QB-BL-13-001-EN-N,
European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, November, 2013, Chart 2, p. 6; Michiel J.
Bijlsma & Gijsbert T. J. Zwart, “The Changing Landscape of Financial Markets in
Europe, The United States and Japan”, in Improving economic policy, Bruegel
Working Paper 2013/02, Bruegel, March, 2013, p. 2.
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of Italy and France); third, the integrated approach (as employed in
Japan, Singapore, Germany, and formerly in the United Kingdom);
and finally, fourth, the ‘Twin Peaks’ approach (as found in The
Netherlands, Switzerland, Qatar, and Spain).

II.

INSTITUTIONAL, TRADITIONAL, OR SILOS
APPROACH7

This approach focuses on the form of legal entity under regulation
and, accordingly, assigns a particular regulator. This mode of financial
system regulation is used in China, Mexico8 and Hong Kong9.

(a) China
In the case of the People’s Republic of China, primary responsibility
for the supervision of the banking sector was moved from the People’s
Bank of China (China’s national central bank (BoC)), to the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003. The CBRC’s remit
includes banks, financial asset managers, trust and investment
companies,

and

other

depositary

financial

institutions.

Its

responsibilities include approving new banking licences, formulating
prudential rules, and conducting compliance examinations. The
People’s Bank of China is limited to setting monetary policy and
acting as LoLR. The China Securities Regulatory Commission

7

Darshana Rajendaran, “Approaches to Financial Regulation and the case of South

Africa”, IFMR Finance Foundation (6 March, 2012); Ernst & Young Australia,
“Effectiveness of Australia’s regulatory settings”, series edited by Ernst & Young
Australia, in Report for the Financial Services Council for submission to the
Financial System Inquiry, Financial Services Council, 2014, pp. 5/18.
8

Working Group on Financial Supervision, “The Structure of Financial

Supervision. Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace”, series edited by
Group of Thirty, in Special Report, Group of Thirty, Consultative Group on
International Economic and Monetary Affairs, Inc., 2008, p. 24/5.
9

Darshana Rajendaran, op cit.
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(CSRC) regulates and supervises the securities and futures markets,
and enforces sanctions.10
In future, as financial entities in China increasingly offer
products that ‘blur the boundaries’, thereby creating issues of
supervisory prerogative and, by implication confusion, contradictions
and potential conflicts are more likely to arise.

(b) Mexico
Similarly with Mexico, an institutional approach holds sway; what the
Mexican authorities refer to as a ‘silo’ approach.11 Mexico maintains
separate regulators for the regulation and supervision of financial
entities, namely the National Banking and Securities Commission
(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) (CNBV), which is a
decentralized entity and a division of the country’s finance ministry.
The CNBV is responsible for maintaining and promoting the stability
of the financial system and protecting depositors. The CNBV
supervises and regulates all financial institutions including banks,
non-bank finance companies, stockbrokers and mutual funds.12 The
National Insurance and Bond Companies Commission (Comisión
Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas) (CNSF) is responsible for regulating
the insurance and surety bond markets,13 and the National
Commission for the Retirement Savings System (Comisión Nacional
del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro) (CONSAR) is both regulator
and supervisor of Mexico’s pension system. Its main objective is to
regulate private financial institutions in charge of the administration

10

China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), “About CSRC”, China

Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 2008, accessed: 7 January, 2015.
11

Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 26.

12

BNamericas, “CNBV (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores)”, series edited

by BNamericas, in Banking, BNamericas, 1996-2014, accessed: 23 September,
2014.
13

BNamericas, “CNSF (Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas)”, series edited by

BNamericas, in Insurance, BNamericas, 1996-2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
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and investment of retirement savings.14 There is no consolidated
supervision and no lead supervisor of financial groups. The National
Commission for the Protection of Financial Services Users (Comisión
Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios
Financieros) (CONDUSEF) is in charge of protection of consumers of
financial services. Its main objectives are to ‘promote, advise, protect
and defend the rights of people who use financial services offered by
institutions operating within Mexico.’15 CONDUSEF operates under
the authority of the Department of Finance and Public Credit, and is
the premier consumer protection organization in Mexico. Finally there
is the Deposit Insurance Agency (Instituto para la Protección al
Ahorro Bancario) (IPAB), responsible for the administration of
deposit insurance. IPAB focuses on four functions, namely: it
guarantees bank deposits up to 400,000 Investment Units (UDIs) 16; it
implements resolutions for insolvent banks, with the objective of
protecting depositors; acts as receiver and liquidator of assets for
insolvent banks; and manages its own debt, primarily, through the
issuance of Savings Protection Bonds.17

(c) Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is the
Hong Kong government’s authority charged with responsibility for

14

BNamericas, “CONSAR (Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el

Retiro)”, series edited by BNamericas, in Insurance, BNamericas, 1996-2014,
accessed: 23 September, 2014.
15

Center for Financial Inclusion, “Client Protection in Mexico”, series edited by

Center for Financial Inclusion, in Publications & Resources, Center for Financial
Inclusion, 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
16

Currently set at 1,900,000.00 MXN pesos, equivalent to approximately US$

143,000.
17

Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), “About the IPAB”, series

edited by Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), Instituto para la
Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), 2012, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
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the maintenance of monetary and banking stability. Its main functions
include the promotion of the stability and integrity of the financial
system, including the banking system, the maintenance of Hong
Kong’s status as an international financial centre, the management of
the Exchange Fund and the maintenance and development of Hong
Kong’s financial infrastructure.18 It is also Hong Kong’s central
bank.19
The HKMA enjoys a high degree of autonomy, and is
accountable through the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong, and
through the laws passed by the Legislative Council that set out the
Monetary Authority’s powers and responsibilities. In his control of the
Exchange Fund, the Financial Secretary is advised by the Exchange
Fund Advisory Committee.20
Securities and Futures are regulated by the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission, whose purpose is to ‘ensure
orderly securities and futures market operations, to protect investors
and help promote Hong Kong as an international financial centre and
a key financial market in China.’21 It is an independent statutory
body.22
The institutional approach to financial system regulation tends
towards a heavily fragmented regulatory environment, ill-equipped to

18

Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), “The HKMA”, series edited by Hong

Kong Monetary Authority, in About the HKMA, Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
2014, accessed: 7 October, 2014.
19

Hong Kong Monetary Authority, “Annual Report 2013”, series edited by Hong

Kong Monetary Authority, in Annual Reports, Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
2014, p. 8.
20

Ibid, p. 1.

21

Securities and Futures Commission, “Our role”, series edited by Securities and

Futures Commission, in About SFC, Securities and Futures Commission, 13 March,
2014, accessed: 7 January, 2015.
22

Securities and Futures Ordinance, No. 5 of 2002, ss 1-409, (enacted: 27 March,

2002), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
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deal with financial entities that are hybrids, such as bank-cuminsurers. Such hybrids then face overlapping and potentially
contradictory regulations. In such an environment, typically, each
regulator will be responsible for both financial system stability and
market conduct and consumer protection issues.23 This approach is
regarded as least capable of dealing with financial conglomerates, the
activities of which blur the boundaries between different types of
financial firms.24
While it is true that the type of legal entity will determine the
types of transactions in which it may engage, and the types of
products it may offer, financial firms typically seek to define new
products so as to circumvent the regulations on the types of products
they may offer. Contemporaneously, regulators seek to broaden their
jurisdiction to accommodate these new products.25
‘Thus, over time, entities with different legal status have been
permitted to engage in the same or comparable activity and be
subject to disparate regulation by different regulators.’26

III.

FUNCTIONAL

The functional approach pays no regard to the type of legal entity in
question, but rather focuses on the types of transactions or products
under regulation. Consequently, one firm engaging in multiple types
of transactions will be subject to multiple regulators. Each regulator is
then responsible for the safety and soundness of the firm, as well as
the business conduct of the firm, as it applies to each type of product

23

Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 24.

24

Ibid, p. 13.

25

Ibid, p. 24.

26

Ibid, p. 24.
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covered by the jurisdiction of each regulator.27 This approach is
currently employed in Italy, France,28 and Brazil29.

(a) Italy
In Italy, banking, investment services, asset management, and
insurance each have their own supervisor, legal framework, and rules.
The Italian NCB, The Bank of Italy, sets monetary policy and is a
member of the European System of Central Banks (Eurosystem). It is
also the bank regulator and supervisor, and is charged with financial
system stability.30 The Bank of Italy not only sets prudential rules and
supervises adherence thereto, but may also impose the full range of
sanctions in instances of breach, which includes the power of
intervention and liquidation.31 Italy’s Companies and Stock Exchange
Commission’s (Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa)
(CONSOB) focus is primarily conduct-of-business oriented, and as
such contains an element of ‘Twin Peaks’.32 In particular CONSOB is
responsible for: protecting the investing public, by ensuring
transparency and correct behaviour by financial market participants;
ensuring the disclosure of complete and accurate information to the
investing public by listed companies; ensuring accuracy in the
prospectuses of transferable securities offered to the public;
compliance with regulations by auditors entered in the Special
Register; and the conduct of investigations of potential infringements
of insider trading and market manipulation.33

27

Ibid, p. 24.

28

Ibid, p. 26.

29

Ibid, p. 85.

30

Ibid, p. 27.

31

Banca d’Italia, “Supervisory Principles And Activities”, series edited by Banca

d’Italia, in Supervision, Banca d’Italia, 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
32

Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 27.

33

Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), “Consob - What it

is and what it does”, series edited by Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la
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(b) France
Similarly, France’s regulatory model is a functional one, with
elements of ‘Twin Peaks.’ The French Prudential Supervisory
Authority (Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution) (ACPR),
established in January 2010, is an ‘independent administrative
authority attached to the Banque de France’,34 which monitors the
activities of banks and insurance companies, and provides for
consumer protection. The ACPR acts as supervisor, regulator and
enforcer of rules, and is also responsible for system stability. 35 The
market conduct regulator is the Autorité des Marchés Financiers
(AMF). The AMF is an independent body responsible for
safeguarding investments in financial products; ensuring that investors
receive material information by way of disclosure; and the
maintenance of orderly financial markets.36
The obvious shortcomings of this model relate chiefly to safety
and soundness considerations, with different regulators potentially
taking different views on the threat posed to the financial system, of
particular firms. Moreover, the types of activities being regulated must
be definable with sufficient clarity, in order to determine which
regulator has jurisdiction.
While this system of financial regulation is common, and can
be effective, provided there is a high degree of communication and

Borsa (CONSOB), Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB),
2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
34

Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), “Ensuring the stability of

the financial system”, series edited by Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de
résolution (ACPR), in Missions, Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution
(ACPR), 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
35

Ibid.

36

Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), “Who we are”, series edited by Autorité

des Marchés Financiers (AMF), in Duties and Powers, Autorité des Marchés
Financiers (AMF), 16 July, 2013, accessed: 23 September, 2014.
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co-operation between regulators, it is nonetheless regarded as suboptimal.37 Again the obvious shortcoming of this approach pertains to
hybrid financial products. In addition it is doubtful whether this
regime can adequately address the growth, importance, and potential
threat posed by shadow banks.

IV.

INTEGRATED OR UNIFIED APPROACH38

Under this model there exists a single financial regulator responsible
for both safety and soundness and business conduct considerations.
This model is often referred to as the ‘FSA Model’, as the former
Financial Services Authority in the UK was this model’s most
prominent example,39 (and one to which this paper will return). This
model differs from the ‘Twin Peaks’ model in that it combines both
stability and business conduct considerations, whereas the ‘Twin
Peaks’ model separates stability and market conduct oversight.
The integrated approach is currently employed in Japan,
Singapore, Germany and the Scandinavian countries.40 It was formerly
employed in the UK. Under the aegis of this system, the United
Kingdom weathered the GFC (poorly), and through various inquiries,
declared that this mode of regulation had failed, and should be
replaced. As an insight into this mode of regulation, the failure that it
represented in the UK is discussed in detail, in Section IV (d) ‘The
United Kingdom, or Pride before the fall’, below.

37

Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 14.

38

Darshana Rajendaran, op cit.

39

Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 24.

40

Michael Taylor & Alex Fleming, “Integrated Financial Supervision. Lessons of

Scandinavian Experience”, Finance & Development. A quarterly magazine of the
IMF, Vol. 36, no. 4 (December, 1999).

11

Andrew Schmulow
(a) Japan
In Japan, The Financial Services Agency is responsible for overseeing
banking, securities and exchange, and insurance, in order to ensure the
stability of the financial system. It is responsible for the protection of
depositors, insurance policy holders, and securities investors. It is
responsible for the inspection and supervision of private sector
financial institutions, and the surveillance of securities transactions. 41
It is an external organ of the Cabinet Office of the Government of
Japan.42 The agency is headed by a Commissioner and reports to the
Minister of State for Financial Services.43 It has jurisdiction over the
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and the
Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board. Its remit
includes the maintenance of fair and transparent financial markets, the
protection of users of the financial system, increased user
convenience, and, as mentioned, the establishment of a stable
financial system.44

(b) Singapore
In Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), is the
NCB, the market conduct regulator, and the prudential regulator. It is
an ‘integrated supervisor overseeing all financial institutions in
Singapore - banks, insurers, capital market intermediaries, financial
advisors, and the stock exchange.’ It also promotes retail investor
education.45 While the MAS is a unitary supervisor, it is nonetheless

41

Financial Services Agency, “Financial Services Agency”, series edited by

Financial Services Agency, Financial Services Agency, The Japanese Government,
p. 3.
42

Ibid, p. 2.

43

Ibid, p. 8.

44

Ibid, p. 6.

45

Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), “About MAS”, series edited by

Monetary Authority of Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2014,
accessed: 6 October, 2014.
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highly regarded and is exceptionally effective, and maintains tight
control of the financial sector in Singapore.46
‘The Singaporeans have transcended the limitations of
compliance and the heretofore dominance of risk management
systems designed in terms of minimizing the risk to the
institution. Instead, it has very consciously aligned the ‘end’ market integrity - with the ‘purpose’ of risk management protecting the public interest. Firms are assessed on their
demonstrable capacity to protect the public interest. This very
clever exercise in regulatory engineering, combined with
demand to report suspicion rather than evidence of wrongdoing
and power of compulsion, creates a Panopticon effect. It may
also lead to warranted confidence in banking industry
exhortations that they are committed to professional integrity. It
is a framework that is deserving of attention47 and emulation.’48
‘“The inspections and reprimands from the Monetary Authority
of Singapore are everything,” a European banking veteran
said. “Not respecting the rules risks huge fines, and even
prison.”’49

There is, therefore, something to be said for organisational
culture in the degree of efficacy of the regulator; be it of the system
stability or the market conduct type. Consequently, while the
Singaporean regime is sub-optimal (although not the least effective –
this dubious honour is reserved for the institutional approach), there is

46

See for example Justin O’Brien, “Singapore Sling: How coercion may cure the

hangover in financial benchmark governance”, Journal of Risk Management in
Financial Institutions, Vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 2014).
47
48

Ibid, p. 184.
Justin O’Brien, “Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in

Financial Benchmark Governance”, series edited by Centre for Law, Markets and
Regulation, in CLMR Research Paper Series, in Working Paper No. 13-7, Faculty of
Law, University of New South Wales, October, 2013, p. 15/16.
49

Tax Justice Network, “Singapore: The Rise and Rise of Asia’s Switzerland”,

series edited by Tax Justice Network, Tax Justice Network, 30 January, 2014,
accessed: 6 October, 2014.
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evidence that that sub-optimality is mitigated by the aggressive and
‘no-nonsense’ manner in which the Singaporean authorities approach
their responsibilities. As an example, in 2011, DBS, the Development
Bank of Singapore, suffered an automatic-teller outage, which lasted a
mere seven hours (3 am to 10 am), of which only one and a half hours,
fell during normal business hours of operation. Nonetheless they were
punished by the MAS, which required DBS to hold an additional
S$230 million capital buffer against operational risk.50 DBS was
required to maintain this additional (and effectively non-profit
generating) capital until October of the following year.
As a key economic pillar, banks are expected to keep their
services up and running all the time. MAS has emphasised this
point in its IBTRM guidelines, saying users expect online
banking services to be accessible ‘24 hours every day of the
year’ and this is ‘tantamount to near-zero system downtime’.51

This contrasts starkly with the manner in which the British
authorities, albeit possessed of a better regulatory model, managed to
produce far less beneficial outcomes among their regulated entities.
By way of contradistinction with the Singapore model, we discuss the
British experience leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, and the
role of the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation, below.

(c) Germany
In Germany the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) are responsible for system stability,
and a smoothly functioning banking supervision regime. The DB’s
regulatory philosophy is one of safeguarding the viability of the

50

Development Bank of Singapore, “Media Statement”, Newsroom, (5 July, 2010),

(accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically; Cesar Tordesillas, “MAS
lifts penalty on DBS bank for online disruption”, Asian Banking & Finance, (30
October, 2011), (accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically.
51

Anonymous, “‘Give public a full account’”, VRForums, (13 July, 2010, 9:27 pm),

(accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically.
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financial sector, which is sensitive to fluctuations in confidence, by
pursuing creditor (note, not purely depositor) protection.
The intensity of supervision depends on the type and scale of
the regulated entity’s business52, that is to say, in essence, its risk
profile (a risk-based supervision regime). In this regard, the regulator
concentrates its attention on whether institutions maintain adequate
capital and liquidity, and on whether they have appropriate risk
control mechanisms.53
The division of supervision between these two entities, in its
most simple form, is that BaFin is the lead supervisor, whereas the
Bundesbank is responsible for macro-prudential supervision.54
BaFin’s supervisory guidelines are issued in consultation with the
Bundesbank, and co-operation between the two is mandated by the
Banking Act55.
The supervisory guidelines delineate areas of authority and are
intended to prevent overlap. The delineation remits to the Bundesbank
the function of ongoing monitoring, pursuant to section 7 (1) of the
Banking Act, within the framework of the Supervisory Review and

52

Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem, “Motives and aims”, series edited by

Deutsche Bundesbank, in Banking supervision, Deutsche Bundesbank, 7 August,
2014, accessed: 9 October, 2014.
53

Federal

Financial

Supervisory

Authority

(BaFin)

(Bundesanstalt

für

Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), “Banks & financial services providers”, series edited
by Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, in Supervision, Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority, accessed: 10 October, 2014.
54

Federal

Financial

Supervisory

Authority

(BaFin)

(Bundesanstalt

für

Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), “Supervision Guideline, Guideline on carrying out
and ensuring the quality of the ongoing monitoring of credit and financial services
institutions by the Deutsche Bundesbank of 21 May 2013”, series edited by Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority, in Cooperation between BaFin and Deutsche
Bundesbank, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 21 May, 2013, accessed: 10
October, 2014.
55

S 7 (1), Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 54,

page 2384, 1999, (enacted: 8 December), (Federal Republic of Germany).
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Evaluation Process (SREP). The monitoring function, in turn,
comprises ascertaining facts, analysing the information received and
collected, evaluating current and potential risks based upon that
information, and appraisals of audit findings. The Bundesbank
performs its monitoring function, while taking account of findings
from its macro-prudential inquiries, in accordance with the Financial
Stability

Act

(FinStabG))56,

(Gesetz
as

zur

well

as

Überwachung
the

der

Finanzstabilität

guidelines,

warnings

and

recommendations of the relevant European Union institutions and the
Committee for Financial Stability (CFS).57
The CFS has a broad range of powers and responsibilities
contained in its enabling provision,58 most notably overall financial
stability (including the causes of potential future crises), and interagency co-ordination and co-operation.
Information obtained from supervision and analysis of audits
is evaluated in order that the Bundesbank may construct a risk profile
of a regulated entity. The risk profile includes an institution’s risks, its
organisation and internal control procedures and an assessment of its
risk-bearing capacity.59

56

Financial Stability Act (Gesetz zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität, FinStabG),

Federal Law Gazette I, page 2369, 2012, (enacted: 28 November), (Federal Republic
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BaFin makes the final summation and assessment of whether
the risks that a given institution has assumed are matched by its
policies, strategies, procedures and mechanisms aimed at ensuring
sound risk-management, and whether the institution has ensured that
the risks that it has assumed are matched by adequate capital. The
primary basis for these assessments is, therefore, the institution’s risk
profile.60
Notwithstanding the Bundesbank’s authority to evaluate
regulated entities, the final decision on all supervisory matters and
questions of interpretation rests with BaFin. In reaching its decision,
BaFin is expected to draw on the Bundesbank’s advice.61

(d) The United Kingdom, or Pride before the fall
Prior to the GFC, this model enjoyed a high degree of support,
particularly for smaller economies, where it was deemed a reasonably
effective method for the regulator to gain oversight of a broad range
of financial services.62 In larger, more complex markets, this method
of regulation had demonstrated a strength in its ability to offer what
was regarded as a streamlined and flexible approach.63 In addition, it
presented a unified focus on regulation and supervision, without
giving rise to jurisdictional disputes,64 or the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage. At the time its principle shortcoming was regarded as its
capacity to present ‘a single point of regulatory failure.’65
The after effects of the GFC in the UK, however, exposed
flaws and repeated and serious failures on the part of the regulator;
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failures that provide an insight into the critical shortcomings of this
method of regulation.
The United Kingdom, (which has now moved to its own
version of the ‘Twin Peaks’ model) had its erstwhile integrated
regulatory regime held-up as an exemplar of excellence in financial
regulation. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was responsible
for both prudential regulation and enforcement, and market conduct.
On the eve of the GFC it was described by the Group of Thirty’s 2008
Report as:
… a model of an efficient and effective regulator, not only
because of its streamlined model of regulation, but also because
it adheres to a series of “principles of good regulation,”
which center on efficiency and economy, the role of
management, proportionality, innovation, the international
character of financial services, and competition. This overlay of
pragmatic business principles, in addition to the traditional
goals of regulation, has been a distinguishing feature of the
U.K. regulatory approach.66

That analysis was provided prior to the Global Financial
Crisis, and the collapse of notable British banks such as Northern
Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland
(HBOS)67. At the time of its collapse HBOS was one of Britain’s ‘big
four’ banks and, consequently, its failure represented a systemic-threat
event for the UK’s economy.
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After the GFC, the FSA was described as ‘thoroughly
inadequate’68 in its oversight of HBOS by the House of Lords, House
of Commons Commission. The Commission stated in its conclusion
that:
… the FSA was not so much the dog that did not bark as a dog
barking up the wrong tree. The requirements of the Basel II
framework not only weakened controls on capital adequacy by
allowing banks to calculate their own risk-weightings, but they
also distracted supervisors from concerns about liquidity and
credit; they may also have contributed to the appalling
supervisory neglect of asset quality. The FSA’s attempts to raise
concerns on these other fronts from late 2007 onwards proved
to be a case of too little, too late69 … The experience of the
regulation of HBOS demonstrates the fundamental weakness in
the regulatory approach prior to the financial crisis and as that
crisis unfolded. … The regulatory approach encouraged a focus
on box-ticking which detracted from consideration of the
fundamental issues with the potential to bring the bank down.
The FSA’s approach also encouraged the Board of HBOS to
believe that they could treat the regulator as a source of
interference to be pushed back, rather than an independent
source of guidance and, latterly, a necessary constraint upon
the company’s mistaken courses of action.70

At the time the FSA failed to understand the pernicious nature
of HBOS’s funding:71 HBOS had returned spectacularly high rates of
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return on equity through aggressive lending – in excess of 20 per
cent,72 and the Bank’s Corporate Division had seen an increase in
assets (in other words loans to borrowers) of 26 per cent in 2002
alone.73
However, such a rapid growth in assets was not matched by
traditional customer deposits and HBOS was forced to turn to
the short-term wholesale markets to cover its funding gap. As
early as 2002, the UK banking regulator, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), raised concerns about the bank’s
funding strategy, returning in 2003 to express disappointment
that the warnings had not been properly heeded, and also
increasing the bank’s capital requirement by 0.5 per cent.74

In response, the HBOS Board simply dismissed the regulator’s
concerns as unwarranted. By 2009, and in the aftermath of the GFC,
HBOS could no longer raise capital in the wholesale funding markets,
and the Board of HBOS engineered that the bank be taken-over by
Lloyds TSB.75 A bank that had operated for 350 years ceased to exist.
By the time the Lloyds take-over had been digested, and more
conservative accounting standards employed, it became apparent that
£ 25 billion of Corporate Division loans were impaired, a staggering
20 per cent of HBOS’s Corporate Division loan book.76 The graph
below provides a comparison of non-performing loans in Australia,
Canada, the UK, the Eurosystem, the remainder of Europe, and the
USA over the same period.
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77

At the time the FSA had developed what came to be termed
the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation – an approach exemplified as
one that regarded banking as a favoured industry, and sought to
impose the lowest possible regulatory burden on banks.78 This policy
significantly contributed to the financial crisis in the UK.
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In its short life, the FSA failed to rein in the banks, and even
encouraged the City to explode in the mid-2000s with a “light
touch” approach to regulation. It did not notice that Northern
Rock was built on such shaky foundations that it could easily
run out of money, and failed to prevent the takeover of ABN
Amro by RBS just as the credit crunch was biting in late 2007.79

As an indication of just how blinded the FSA was to the extent
of the crisis metastasizing in the UK, its report into the RBS
acquisition of ABN Amro – an acquisition which was disastrous for
RBS, and which culminated in the bank’s collapse – asserted that:
[w]hile RBS’s governance, systems and controls and decisionmaking may have fallen short of best practice, and below the
practices of a number of peer firms, the FSA could not take
action where decisions made or systems in place were not
outside

the

bounds

of

reasonableness

given

all

the

circumstances at the time, including FSA awareness of issues
and the approach it took at that time. The FSA may not apply
standards of conduct retrospectively against the firms and
individuals it regulates, on the basis that to do so would raise
serious issues of unfairness.80

These assertions however, appear open to question. First, if it
is the regulator’s responsibility to regulate in order to prevent future
crises, or at least to prevent systemic weaknesses if it cannot prevent
individual firm weakness, then one must rightly conclude that warning
signs were either missed or left unheeded. The ‘light touch’ culture
within the regulatory agencies would support the latter conclusion.
Second, it is suggested that the failure to prosecute is not only a
function of the prohibition on retrospectivity; it is also a function of
legislative drafting that is not termed broadly enough to punish –
criminally - past reckless conduct. It is of note also that the RBS-ABN
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Amro deal went through after the wholesale money markets, upon
which RBS relied through its subsidiary, NatWest81, had become
paralysed,82 and four weeks after the run on Northern Rock. All of
which point to a regulator asleep at the wheel.
The FSA report acknowledged the poor timing of the ABN
Amro deal, and by implication their complicity in allowing the deal to
proceed.83
In his foreword to the FSA report on the RBS-ABN Amro
takeover, Lord Turner, FSA Chairman, stated that readers of the report
may be surprised to find that prior to the takeover, RBS had procured
two lever-arch folders and a CD84 as the sum total of their due
diligence. Hosking’s response to this point is to argue that:
His suggestion is clear: if only RBS had garnered more
information, if only there had been more lever-arch files,
disaster might have been averted. This is the philosophy of the
deluded bureaucrat. If only there had been more reports, more
meetings; if only more boxes had been ticked, more forms filled
in. On the Origin of Species, the Bible and the collected works
of Shakespeare could be contained in two lever-arch folders
and a CD. How much more information does Lord Turner think
RBS needed? … It’s not volume of information that matters. It’s
quality.85
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In the three and a half years prior to RBS’s collapse, the FSA
met with RBS 511 times.86 But, again, as Hosking points out:
It’s typical that there is someone to count them, but no one to
explain what on earth went on in them ... would [it] have been
better had there been a thousand? The FSA tells us that 0.5 of
an FSA manager and 4.5 team members were assigned to RBS
as it was mounting the bid.87 The clipboard-hugging precision
of those decimals speaks volumes … The report is a blizzard of
acronyms and bogus science: RBS was scored as a “medium
high minus”88 risk, whatever that is …89

There were other notable examples of regulatory failure that
emerged after the GFC, such as price-manipulation of the London
Interbank

Offered

Rate

(LIBOR).

The Parliamentary Select

Committee investigation into LIBOR found, inter alia, that:
The manipulation was spotted neither by the FSA nor the Bank
of England at the time. That doesn’t look good90 … It will be a
great step forward if the regulators get away from box-ticking
and endless data collection and instead devote more careful
thought to where risk really lies… It will involve a change in
culture on the part of the regulators and is a major challenge
for the future.91

Glaringly inconsistencies were exposed: the FSA had
pressured Barclays CEO Bob Diamond to step down, over his bank’s
role in rigging the LIBOR. But as the Treasury Select Committee
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found, this was in response to public pressure and not, for example,
the FSA’s Final Notice,92 issued to Barclays, some twelve months
earlier.93
On Monday night, Adair Turner, chairman of the FSA, called
Barclays asking that “any obstacle” be removed in resolving
the crisis, according to a person familiar with the matter. Mr.
Diamond tendered his resignation shortly after.94

In its findings, the Commission of Inquiry into the LIBOR
rigging, as recently as 2013 – fully five years after the GFC – found
that:
[T]he scale and breadth of regulatory failure was also
shocking. International capital requirements led to the FSA
becoming mired in the process of approving banks’ internal
models to the detriment of spotting what was going on in the
real business. … They neglected prudential supervision in
favour of a focus on detailed conduct matters … the FSA left the
UK poorly protected from systemic risk. Multiple scandals also
reflect their failure to regulate conduct effectively. (Paragraph
931).95

In the aftermath of the GFC one of the conclusions reached on
the performance of the FSA found, inter alia, that:
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On occasions [the tripartite system, namely the Bank of
England, H.M. Treasury, and the FSA] functioned with jawdropping incompetence and chaos.96
Serious regulatory failure has contributed to the failings in
banking standards. The misjudgement of the risks in the precrisis period was reinforced by a regulatory approach focused
on detailed rules and process which all but guaranteed that the
big risks would be missed. Scandals relating to mis-selling by
banks were allowed to assume vast proportions, in part because
of the slowness and inadequacy of the regulatory response.97

What this belies was that prior to the GFC, the FSA had fallen
prey to form over function; to process over outcomes. Its Approved
Persons Regime was described as a ‘flagrant’ failure.98
Prior to the GFC, the UK regulatory authorities had moved to
a principles-based as opposed to a rules-based approach to regulation.
That is to say, the FSA laid out a set of principles, primarily related to
risk, and allowed financial firms to decide how to address those
principles.
Firms’ managements – not their regulators – are responsible
for identifying and controlling risks. A more principles-based
approach allows them increased scope to choose how they go
about this. In short, the use of principles is a more grown-up
approach to regulation than one that relies on rules.99
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By 2009, John Turner’s successor, Hector Sants, had
abandoned the principles-based approach, stating at the time that ‘A
principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have
no principles.’100
In response to these findings, Black and Baldwin provide a
spirited defence of risk-based regulation, that is to say, regulation that
is principles-based. Evidently they have failed to learn from the
experience of the UK and, it appears, the school of thought to which
they subscribe is anything but out of fashion.101 They argue, for
example, that regulators need to be responsive to, inter alia, ‘regulated
firms’ behavior, attitude, and culture.’102 Admirable a goal as that may
appear to be, it neglects the fact that regulating behaviour, attitude and
culture is highly subjective, least able to be quantified, and therefore
susceptible to regulatory forbearance, and susceptible to industry and
political pressure.
In defence of their position, Black and Baldwin assert that
risk-based regulation should not be regarded as completely discredited
by the financial crisis that befell the UK, because similar crises did not
befall other countries in which risk-based regulation was also
employed, such as Australia or Canada.103
It is argued, however, that it was not risk-based regulation that
failed to fail, as it were, in Australia or Canada. Rather it was more
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conservative banking strategies, less prone to highly derived, opaque
and esoteric investment instruments, than risk-based regulation, that
saved those two countries.104 Put differently, Australia and Canada
survived the GFC not because of the efficacy of risk-based
regulations, but through sheer good luck105 – Australian banks’ underexposure to the CDO market, coupled with targeted, government
largesse.106
Clearly not all the blame for the failure of HBOS or RBS can
or should be laid at the feet of the FSA. In the case of HBOS’s, the
Board of Directors must shoulder a significant degree of blame as
well. But it is in the nature of the failings of the conduct of HBOS’s
directors that we find further evidence of the failure of a system that
seeks to manage risk, not conduct. The House of Lords, House of
Commons Commission had this to say:
The corporate governance of HBOS at board level serves as a
model for the future, but not in the way in which Lord
Stevenson and other former Board members appear to see it. It
represents a model of self-delusion, of the triumph of process
over purpose.107 … We are shocked and surprised that, even
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after the ship has run aground, so many of those who were on
the bridge still seem so keen to congratulate themselves on their
collective navigational skills.108

Summarising the entire debacle, and the challenges it
presented to the very foundations of financial system safety, Andy
Haldane109 stated:
For the most part the financial crisis was not the result of
individual wickedness or folly. It is not a story of pantomime
villains and village idiots. Instead the crisis reflected a failure
of the entire system of [the UK’s]

financial sector

governance.110

The FSA has now been dissolved, and replaced with a separate
market conduct authority, the Financial Conduct Authority111, and a
separate bank regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority112, a
division of the Bank of England. Put differently the UK has, as a
result, adopted a ‘Twin Peaks’ system.
What this indicates is that the authorities, in the UK at least,
have rejected the integrated approach as inadequate to the task. The
failures of the FSA, however, cannot be ascribed to the design of the
regulatory architecture alone. Pervasive and profound shortcomings in
the organisational culture of the FSA played a significant role in its
failures and, it is argued, these would be addressed, only in part, by
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reforming the regulatory regime.113 Thus far, that message has been
lost because the most recent incarnation of the prudential regulator
presents a case of déjà vu: its location as a division of the Bank of
England.
After the failure of the venerable Barings Bank in 1995,
regulation (or more correctly, self-regulation) of the banking
industry in the UK was ripped away from the Bank of England
… In the new structure, prudential regulation was hived off to
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and, in an
illustration that governments never learn the lessons of history,
this body was handed back to the Bank of England...114

One aspect mitigating the likelihood of regulatory capture, and
consequently forbearance is, therefore, the location of the regulator,
and the degree of independence that the regulator enjoys: in effect the
degree to which the regulator is insulated from political and industry
pressure or interference. In this respect this writer is firmly of the view
that a ‘non-monopolist approach’ – in which the regulator is a separate
entity from the NCB - like that followed in Australia, but unlike that
followed in the UK, is preferable. It bears repeating however, that
post-FSA, the regulator has again been located within the Bank of
England, and this, it is argued, is sub-optimal.
In response to the failures of principles-based regulation,
regulators in the United Kingdom have embraced instead a
judgement-based system of regulation.115 That is to say that, instead of
measuring banks risk against a set of stated principles, regulators will
instead exercise their discretion to ensure that problems are tackled
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early – in theory. But, it is argued, a judgement-based approach is
malleable, subjective, and open to political and market pressure.
Indeed, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache point out:
When we explore the relationship between soundness and
compliance with specific groups of principles, which refer to
separate areas of prudential supervision and regulation, we
continue to find no evidence that good compliance is related to
improved soundness. If anything, we find that stronger
compliance with principles related to the power of supervisors
to license banks and regulate market structure are associated
with riskier banks.116

Further complicating the issue of financial regulation in the
UK under the new regime, is the establishment of a third body, the
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the remit of which is to look for
the roots of the next crisis.117 Its remit is to identify, monitor and take
action to remove or reduce systemic risks. It has a secondary
objective, which is to support the economic policy of the
Government.118
The FPC is a statutory sub-committee of Court of the Bank of
England, and its members include the Governor, three of the Deputy
Governors, the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA), the Bank’s Executive Director for Financial Stability, Strategy
and Risk, four external members appointed by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and a non-voting representation of the Treasury.119
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Of course, in regulation, one can never have enough acronyms
and to oversee these two new regulators there is yet another
regulator, the FPC (or Financial Policy Committee) which is to
be part of the Bank of England. In other words: BOE 2, FSA
0.120

V.

TWIN PEAKS

This method is exemplified by regulation by objective. As the name
suggests, this regime comprises two regulators, whose objectives are,
alternatively, systemic stability, and market conduct and consumer
protection.121

Examples

include

Australia,

the

Netherlands122

Switzerland,123 Qatar, and Spain. Italy, France, and the USA have
indicated an interest in adopting this method of financial regulation,
the UK has adopted ‘Twin Peaks’, and South Africa is well advanced
towards adoption.124
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(a) The Netherlands
The Kingdom of the Netherlands was second to adopt a ‘Twin Peaks’
approach in 2002125, retaining prudential supervision within De
Nederlandsche Bank N.V.126 (‘The Dutch Bank’ (DNB)). This is
similar to the arrangement in the UK, but in contradistinction to
Australia, where the prudential regulator (APRA) is separate from the
NCB.
While it is asserted that the Netherlands fared relatively well
during the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in staving-off a
financial crisis in an economy with such an important financial sector,
was not achieved without drastic government intervention.
Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to over 300% of
GDP. The Dutch financial system therefore depended heavily
on external developments. Only the Belgian and Irish banking
sectors were in a similar position. The European average was
less than half the Dutch figure at 135% of GDP. … exposure of
Dutch banks to the United States also was the highest in
Europe, at 66% of GDP. … whereas the average of European
banks had kept limited exposure of less than 30% of GDP. By
contrast, the exposure of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern
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European countries was at 11% of GDP just above the
European average of 8% of GDP.127

Intervention during the crisis took the form of measures to
stimulate employment through construction and housing (€ 6 billion);
capital injections for banks and insurers (€ 20 billion); state
guarantees for banks (€ 200 billion); a guarantee on all deposits up to
€100,000128; the nationalisation of the Fortis/ABN AMRO (€ 16.8
billion) and ING banking groups (€ 10 billion), comprising 85 per
cent of the Dutch banking sector,129 and the SNS REAAL insurance
and banking group (€ 3.7 billion)130; and a reform of the financial
system and the capital levels that had been enforced to date.
Thereafter the Dutch government was compelled to drastically reduce
spending in order to reduce its deficit.131
In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions reached about the
performance of the Dutch regulators were less than positive:
Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis, supervisory
instruments fell short in several areas. These deficiencies
emerged in both the scope and the substance of supervision.
The trend towards lighter supervision, reflecting developments
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within the financial sector as well as changed social attitudes,
has gone too far.132

This finding supports the conclusions reached in the analysis
of the performance of the UK regulatory authorities during the GFC,
namely that regulatory architecture alone is not a panacea against
financial crisis. Doubtless regulatory architecture is part of the
solution, but no more so than the capacity of the regulator to foresee,
at times, the unforeseeable, and regulate accordingly, and the
willingness of the regulator to enforce its regulations.

(b) Switzerland
In the case of Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank is responsible for
financial stability. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) defines a stable
financial system as ‘a system whose individual components –
financial intermediaries and the financial market infrastructure – fulfil
their respective functions and prove resistant to potential shocks.’133
Oversight of systemically important payment and securities
settlement systems is assigned to the SNB. In this regard the SNB cooperates with the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA), pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with
clear divisions of the individual mandates of the two institutions. The
MoU also regulates this co-operation.134
The SNB acts as lender of last resort (LoLR), by providing
liquidity assistance against collateral, should domestic banks no
longer be able to refinance their open-market operations. The
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supervision of the banking sector is the responsibility of the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).135
FINMA’s remit is the protection of creditors, investors and
policyholders and the maintenance of the smooth functioning of
financial markets. FINMA is responsible for supervision and
regulation of participants in the financial markets.136
FINMA has authority over banks, insurers, stock exchanges,
securities dealers, collective investment schemes, distributors and
insurance intermediaries. It issues licenses and is responsible for
combating money laundering. In addition it imposes sanctions and,
where necessary, conducts restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings.
FINMA

supervises

‘disclosure

of

shareholdings,

conducts

proceedings, issues rulings and, where wrongdoing is suspected, files
criminal complaints with the Swiss Federal Department of Finance
(FDF).’137 It supervises public takeover bids and acts as an appeals
tribunal against decisions of the Swiss Takeover Board (TOB). It
participates in the legislative process, issues ordinances where
authorised, ‘publishes circulars concerning the interpretation and
application of financial market laws, and is responsible for the
recognition of self-regulatory standards.’138

(c) Qatar
In Qatar the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) is an
independent regulatory authority, established to supervise financial
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markets and securities firms. It is empowered to exercise regulatory
oversight and regulatory enforcement over the capital markets. Its
remit is to protect investors, ensure fair and efficient financial
markets, enhance transparency and market integrity, and prevent firms
from engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct in the provision
of financial products and services.139
The Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority is an
independent regulator, the remit if which is to authorise and regulate
firms and individuals conducting financial services. It is a principlesbased regulator. Its objectives include the promotion and maintenance
of efficiency, transparency, integrity and confidence, as well as the
maintenance of financial stability and the reduction of systemic risk.
Its remit also includes the development of financial awareness and
protection for customers and investors.140
Interestingly, Qatar has established a Qatar Financial Centre
(QFC) Civil and Commercial Court, for resolving disputes between
financial firms and their counterparties, and for the arbitration or the
formal resolution of civil disputes. Qatar has also established the QFC
Regulatory Tribunal for hearing appeals by entities, individuals and
corporate bodies against decisions of the QFC Regulatory
Authority.141
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(d) Spain
In Spain, the Spanish regime includes three authorities: the Bank of
Spain, the National Securities Market Commission (Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores) (CNMV), and the Directorate
General of Insurance and Pension Funds (Dirección General de
Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones) (DGS).
The Bank of Spain is responsible for prudential supervision
and regulation.142 These functions are divided into two Directorates
General: the Directorate General Banking Regulation and Financial
Stability and the Directorate General Banking Supervision.143 The
stated objective of the Bank’s supervisory process is to determine a
risk profile for each institution, in order to provide the Bank of Spain
with a capacity to maintain financial system stability, by foreseeing
and preventing future bank crises.144 This risk profile aggregates the
possibility of a credit institution developing solvency, profitability or
liquidity problems in the future, into a single variable.145
The method used by the Spanish Bank is known as
‘Supervision of the Banking Activity By Risk Approach (SABER)’,
which aims to provide a uniform ratings framework. The elements
analysed are represented in a risk matrix, which represent different
ratings, some of which are objectively quantifiable, some of which are
subjective in nature, such as management and control.146
The SABER aims to determine which institutions are more
likely to develop problems in the future. Special attention is paid to
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institutions with a supervisory risk profile above a certain rating. The
supervision framework for the different institutions is based on the
supervisory risk profile and systemic importance of the institution.
The framework is updated as required, but always at least annually.147
The Spanish National Securities Market Commission is
responsible for supervising and inspecting the Spanish Stock Markets
and the activities of all its participants.148 The CNMV’s remit is to
ensure transparency in the Spanish market, correct price formation,
and the protection of investors. The CNMV also promotes disclosure
of information, in order to achieve investor protection.149 The CNMV
audits and develops new disclosure requirements relating to
remuneration schemes for directors and executives, linked to the
company’s share price. It also aims to detect and pursue illegal
activities by unregistered intermediaries. The Commission has
jurisdiction over companies that issue securities for public placement,
the secondary markets in securities, and investment services
companies. The Commission also exercises prudential supervision
over the last two in order to ensure transaction security and the
solvency of the system.150 The entities over which the CNMV
exercises its jurisdiction include: Collective Investment Schemes,
which includes: investment companies (securities and real estate),
investment funds (securities and real estate) and their management
companies; Broker-Dealers and Dealers - entities engaging primarily
in the purchase and sale of securities; and Portfolio Management
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Companies - entities focusing primarily on managing individuals’
assets (principally securities).151
The Spanish Directorate General of Insurance and Pension
Funds regulates and supervises private insurance and reinsurance,
insurance brokers and reinsurance and pension plans. It protects
policyholders, beneficiaries, third parties and participants in pension
plans through a complaints resolution process. It handles inquiries
about insurance and monitors compliance.152
The DGS examines the valuation of assets and liabilities,
conducts overall compliance reviews, and conducts reviews and
assessments of risks and solvency. It controls mergers and other
transactions between insurance companies aimed at improving the
structure of the sector, in conjunction with the National Markets And
Competition Commission. In addition, the DGS is responsible for the
supervision of market conduct.153

(e) Australia
The ‘Twin Peaks’ model was proposed by, and implemented on, the
conclusion of the Wallis Commission of Inquiry in 1997.154 To wit,
Australia has separated the market conduct and consumer protection
authority – the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(ASIC) – from the bank regulator – the Australian Prudential
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Regulation Authority (APRA) – and the National Central Bank (NCB)
– the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).
The RBA is tasked with, inter alia, overall responsibility for
the financial system, and is lender of last resort (LoLR). The
Australian model could therefore reasonably be described as a threepeak model.
Each one of these peaks is an independent, statutory body.155
While the Australian model provides a high degree of statutory
independence for the system stability regulator,156 APRA, it is to a
degree answerable to the Treasurer,157 and both APRA158 and ASIC159
to the Federal Parliament by way of submission of Annual Reports.
This comports with what Taylor envisages for the model as either
Ministerial oversight or Parliamentary oversight.160
The second entity is responsible for market conduct and
consumer protection. It is argued such a system is more likely to
resolve fragmentation, provide clarity of ambit, be more cost-effective
due to rulebook simplification, and improve accountability – more
likely, but not definitely, as the recent failings of ASIC in Australia
have demonstrated.161 If the consumer protection and market conduct
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regulator does prove effective, then advantages accrue to consumers
for a ‘“one-stop shop”’162 for complaints against a regulated firm.
While in Australia the prudential regulator is an entity separate
from the National Central Bank (NCB), such ‘non-monopolist’
arrangements are not universal – that is to say there are instances
where the regulator is part of the NCB (monopolist regimes, such as
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), and others
where the regulator is separate.
There is no definitive answer as to which regime is preferable,
but the available evidence favours a non-monopolist approach.163
Banking sectors in ‘monopolist’ countries are more protected
and somehow less developed and efficient than those in ‘nonmonopolist’ countries.164

There are, in addition, conflicts of interest165 that ought to be
considered in the location of the PA. The NCB’s focus is primarily a
macro-prudential one, whereas the PA’s focus is chiefly microprudential. Consequently, as lender of last resort, the NCB may find
itself under pressure to assist regulated institutions, when the PA is
located within the NCB. We argue that such conflicts of interest are
best avoided.
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Within this more usual context, the conflict of interest may arise
between the monetary authorities, who wish for higher rates
(e.g. to maintain an exchange rate peg, to bear down on
inflation, or to reduce the pace of monetary growth), and the
regulatory authorities who are frightened about the adverse
effects such higher rates may have upon the bad debts,
profitability, capital adequacy and solvency of the banking
system.166

A further instance for potential conflicts of interest between
the NCB and the PA, include the expectation that the NCB will be
influenced by stability considerations, when determining monetary
policy,167 or that the NCB may employ open market operations and
access to the discount window as a supervisory instrument.168
Lastly, Di Noia et al169 assert that conflicts may arise between
macro (monetary) and micro (regulatory) policy. Monetary policy
tends to be anti-cyclical, whereas regulatory policy tends to be procyclical.170 Di Noia et al171 cite an example where, during an economic
slowdown, a bank’s non-performing assets may increase, precipitating
higher loan-loss provisioning rules, and a pressure to increase the
quality of the bank’s portfolio from the Regulator. As Tuya et al172
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point-out, this leads to a restriction in credit, at precisely the time
when monetary policy should be expansionary.
In terms of inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination, the
Australian model addresses this through various memoranda of
understanding.173
Whereas the legislative framework for regulatory coordination is high-level and outcomes-focused, it does not, however,
provide detailed provisions as to the nature of co-ordination and how
it should be achieved.174 Instead, s 10A of the APRA Act175 provides in
general terms as follows:
(1) The Parliament intends that APRA should, in performing
and exercising its functions and powers, have regard to the
desirability of APRA coordinating with other financial sector
supervisory agencies, and with other agencies specified in
regulations for the purposes of this subsection. (2) This section
does not override any restrictions that would otherwise apply to
APRA or confer any powers on APRA that it would not
otherwise have.

The RBA has asserted that cultivating a culture of coordination, under which the main focus is on regulatory performance,
rather than regulatory structure, is crucially important. The Assistant
Governor (Financial) of the RBA has attributed the efficacy of coordination between the regulators in Australia to a culture ‘where we regard cooperation with the other agencies as an
important part of our job, and there is a strong expectation
from the public and the government that we will continue to do
so…Key aspects [of coordination] include an effective flow of
information across staff in the market operations and
macroeconomic departments of a central bank and those
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working in the areas of financial stability and bank supervision.
Regular meetings among these groups to focus on risks and
vulnerabilities and to highlight warning signs can be very
valuable. A culture of coordination among these areas is very
important in a crisis because, in many instances, a stress
situation is first evident in liquidity strains visible to the central
bank, and the first responses may be calls on central bank
liquidity.’176

The success Australia achieved in addressing the challenges
arising out of the Global Financial Crisis and the 2010 Sovereign Debt
Crisis has been attributed to this flexible approach to inter-agency cooperation. Indeed, in interviews conducted with the regulators in
Australia, it was evident that over-prescription, or formalisation,
would have stifled this flexibility.177
To facilitate this co-operation, Australia has established the
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR),178 whose purpose it is to
oversee inter-agency co-operation.
The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia’s main
financial regulatory agencies. Its membership comprises APRA,
ASIC, the RBA and the Treasury. ... It is a non-statutory
interagency body, and has no regulatory functions separate
from those of its four members.
CFR meetings are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with
secretariat support provided by the RBA. They are typically
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held four times per year but can occur more frequently... As
stated in the CFR Charter, the meetings provide a forum for:
• identifying important issues and trends in the financial
system, including those that may impinge upon overall financial
stability;
• … appropriate coordination arrangements for responding to
actual or potential instances of financial instability, and
helping to resolve any issues where members’ responsibilities
overlap;
…
Much of the input into CFR meetings is undertaken by
interagency working groups, which has the additional benefit of
promoting

productive

working

relationships

and

an

appreciation of cross-agency issues at the staff level.
The CFR has worked well since its establishment and, during
the crisis in particular, it has proven to be an effective means of
coordinating responses to potential threats to financial
stability…
The experience since its establishment, and especially during
the crisis, has highlighted the benefits of the existing nonstatutory basis of the CFR.’179

While this arrangement may have succeeded in insulating
Australia from the ravages of the GFC in respect of system stability,
the Australian regulatory model has not fared as well in respect of
combatting market misconduct, or the protection of consumers, as the
financial advice scandals at the Commonwealth Bank (CBA) and
Macquarie Bank have demonstrated.180 ASIC’s paltry performance in
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addressing these malpractices at CBA and Macquarie were heavily
criticised by an inquiry led by the Upper House of Australia’s Federal
Parliament.181 Considering the international fashionability of ‘Twin
Peaks’, and in particular the influence of the Australian model, the
failures and shortcomings of ASIC – one half of the two peaks – has
been a significant and sobering practical failure.
In its Final Report, the Australian Financial System Inquiry
has recommended that in the future Australia establish a Financial
Regulator Assessment Board, the purpose of which would be to
annually provide advice to the Government on how financial
regulators have implemented their mandates, and ‘provide clearer
guidance to regulators in Statements of Expectation and increase the
use of performance indicators for regulator performance.’182
This proposal has precedent in the UK, which has established a
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the remit of which is to look for
the roots of the next crisis.183 Its remit is to identify, monitor and take
action to remove or reduce systemic risks. It has a secondary
objective, which is to support the economic policy of the
Government.184
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VI.

CONCLUSION

There are many elements that underpin the effectiveness of the ‘Twin
Peaks’ system of financial regulation, under which there are separate
regulators for prudential supervision and market conduct. These
include a clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between
each regulator; effective co-ordination between the regulators;
transparency and accountability on the part of each regulator; effective
powers of supervision and enforcement; operational independence of
each regulator (vis-à-vis the executive government); a sound
governance system and adequate resources.185
However, even with all of these criteria in place, a ‘Twin
Peaks’ regulatory system is no guarantee against financial crises or
even financial distress, as was evident in the Netherlands during the
GFC. Nor is ‘Twin Peaks’ a guarantee against financial firms
engaging in market misconduct or consumer abuse, as the experience
with ASIC and its oversight of the Commonwealth Bank and
Macquarie Bank in Australia indicate, and as evidenced in the
subsequent findings of the Senate of the Australian Federal
Parliament.
What ‘Twin Peaks’ does offer is a good start, by imposing
what the evidence strongly suggests is the best and most optimal
regulatory architecture. From there the avoidance of financial crises
and market abuse will depend upon the culture and leadership of the
two peaks, and their willingness to tackle difficult questions and
powerful vested interests. That in turn is in large measure dependent
upon the extent to which political leaders are insulted from industry
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pressure, and the extent to which the government will adequately fund
and resource the regulators. To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill,
‘Twin Peaks’ is not the beginning of the end. It is merely the end of
the beginning.
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